CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA-THE HAGUE RULES
The codification of international law is a subject of neverfailing interest. "A system of law to be applied between nations
exists. Its sources are known and have been stated authoritatively and in sufficient detail." I Undoubtedly there are to be
found many who would be willing to accept the challenge of this
statement, but in the field of maritime law which is probably the
oldest branch of the Law of Nations there has been found even
2
"The queswithin these pages a recent champion of uniformity.
Professor
writes
tion (of the uniformity of maritime law),"
Wright, "is not one which a lawyer alone should attempt to
answer-it is quite as much of fact as of law; and neither should
an economist. Together, however, they might accomplish something." That sentence, had it been written five years earlier,
would have been prophetic, for the greatest step towards international uniformity which the present century has seen owes much
to the commercial world and to economists. That it is still
executory is due not to those who created it, nor to the world of
commerce, but rather to the extreme tardiness of legislative
machinery.
Maritime Transportation is as old as the history of jurisprudence, and there are to be found in many ancient legal codes
elaborate provisions governing the rights and duties of the three
parties to marine adventures-the captain, the merchants and the
crew. Bills of lading bearing a close resemblance to the modern
form cannot, however, claim more than two or three centuries of
life, and if by "modem form" we should refer to the long documents in minute print with which the modern shipper is all too
familiar, we can go back no further than 188o, for it is during the
past half century, that shipowners havd been so active in the
limitation of their liability. To deny all equitable justification to
this process of limitation is to betray an ignorance of both the
technical business of ship-operation and of the legal duties of ship1
J. B. Scott-Year Book of Carnegie Endowment, I923-p. 237; The
Paquete Habana, 175 U. S. 677, 700 (899).
'Austin Tappan Wright-73 U. oF PA. L. REv. 123-223 (1924).
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owners, who were placed by the rules of common law under a
burden which threatened to crush all initiative and to paralyse the
industry. Even the merchants and shippers realised the necessity
of some limitation of liability beyond that given by the legal
systems of the great maritime nations, and the early clauses
included in the bill of lading to that end were readily accepted.
The opportunity thus given them proved too enticing for the
shipowners to refrain from taking advantage of it: clause succeeded clause in the bill of lading until it grew almost beyond
recognition. National legislation 3 seemed to have very little
effect and the discontent among the shipping public grew from
year to year, until the whole matter was brought to an head during
the war and post-war period by the unavoidable and not in all
cases undesirable extension of the business of shipowning into the
hands of governments, coupled with the creation of new shipping
companies, lacking in experience and, in some cases, not motivated
by any desire to build up a good reputation such as had been
earned by the older companies during their long histories.
Before proceeding to the fruits of this discontent it may be
well to touch briefly upon the outstanding grievances against the
then-existing bill of lading. Invariably the opening phrase would
read "Received in good order and condition
.
to be transported by the good ship X from the port of A and bound for B."
There is here no clear definition of the commencement or termination of the contract. Where nothing is expressly stated in the
body of the contract American law subjects common carriers by
sea to the onerous liabilities of common carriers at common law
as soon as the goods are delivered to him for immediate shipment,4
and causes his liability to cease upon the lapse of a reasonable
time for the removal of the goods after notice of arrival has been
given to the consignee.5 The English law, and the common
practice of the carriers, however, makes the carrier so liable only
during such period as the goods are actually within his physical
'Harter Act 1893 (27 Stat. 445, U. S. Comp. Stat. sec. 8029-8035) ; New
Zealand Shipping & Seamen Act, i9o3; Australian Sea Carriage of Goods
Act, 1904; Canadian Water Carriage of Goods Act, i9o.
'Canadian Pacific v. Wieland, 226 Fed. 670 (C. C. A. i915).
'The Titania, I3 Fed. 229 (C. C. A. 19o4).
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control, that is, from the moment they are received by the ship's
tackle 6 until the time that they are placed upon a pier, wharf, or
lighter for delivery to the consignee.7 Under either practice a.
twilight zone will clearly exist at each end of the voyage, during
which it is difficult to attach liability to any party for any loss or
appears to
damage which the goods may suffer, and this difficulty
7
have been in no way remedied by the Harter Act. a
There follows immediately a clause beginning with the somewhat provocative phrase "It is mutually agreed" and proceeding
to state that the shipowner shall not be liable for a long and
growing list of possible casualties. Taking a bill of lading at
random 8 and omitting the provisions as to deviation and ports of
refuge, the clause continues "The carrier shall not be liable for
loss, delay or damage occasioned by perils of the sea or other
waters, by fire from any cause or wheresoever occurring; by
barratry of the master or crew; by enemies, pirates, robbers or
thieves; by arrest and restraint of princes, rulers or peoples, riots,
strikes, lock-outs or stoppage of labour; by explosion, bursting of
boilers, breaking of shafts, or any other latent defect in hull,
machinery or appurtenances, or unseaworthiness of the steamer,
whether existing at the time of shipment or at the beginning of
the voyage, provided the owners have exercised due diligence to
make the steamer seaworthy; by, or resulting from, faults or
errors in navigation or in the management of the steamer; by heat,
frost, decay, putrefaction, rust, sweat, change of character, drainage, leakage, breakage, vermin, damage from smell, sweat or evaporation from other goods, or by explosion of any of the goods,
whether shipped with or without disclosure of their nature, or any
loss or damage arising from the nature of the goods or the insufficiency of packages; nor for land damage; nor for the obliteration,
errors, insufficiency or absence of marks, numbers, address or
description, or wrong delivery arising therefrom; nor for risk of
SBlaikie v. Sternbridge, 6 C. B. (N. S.) 894 (Eng. i859); Harris v. Best,

7 Asp. M. C.

272

(Eng. 1892).

'Chartered Bank of India v. British India Stn. Nvg. Co., L. R. (igog)
A. C. 369.
' Gilchrist Trading Co. v. Boston Co., 223 Fed. 716 (C. C. A. i915).
"Liverpool-New Orleans (i9o7) Form.
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craft, hulk or transshipment; nor by the prolongation of the
voyage, or any cause beyond the carrier's control." Even this
stupendous clause is less severe than some that could easily have
been found, and it was not unnatural that complaints should have
arisen from shippers who had almost come to believe the rather
cynical statement that the shipowners were not compelled to do
anything but accept the freight money!
It might be imagined that the shipowner was content with such
a limitation of his liability, yet a so-called "benefit of insurance"
clause almost invariably followed in either one of two forms, (i)
"carrier not liable for any damage that may be covered by
insurance," or (2) "carrier shall have the benefit of any insurance
effected upon the goods." 9 The effect of the first alternative is
to incorporate the marine insurance policy in the bill of lading,
and insurance can be had against every conceivable risk if an
adequate premium be paid. In the second case, which is still valid
and enforceable in the United States, a shipper who sustained a
loss was compelled to turn over to the carrier any insurance money
he received in settlement. The insurance company paid the
shipper and then sued the carrier, if he was liable. If the carrier
was compelled to pay the underwriter, he demanded the insurance
money previously received by the shipper. To avoid such a contingency the underwriters adopted the practice of granting a loan
to the shipper to cover the amount of any claim, and then proceeding against the carrier in the name of the assured. If any
recovery is had the shipper repays the amount of the loan; if not
he retains it-a method which has been upheld by the Courts.10
A valuation clause follows, setting out that "it is mutually
agreed that unless an higher value be stated herein and an
increased freight rate specially arranged therefor, the value of the
merchandise hereby receipted for does not exceed the sum of one
hundred dollars United States currency." Occasionally the figure
was as high as $200 or even $250, but the lower figure was more
'Hearings
on Theft and Pilferage, July,
"0Luckenbach v. McCahan Sugar Refining
Turret Crown, 297 Fed. 766 (C. C. A. 1924)
in a bill of lading in which the shipper agreed
to the benefit of the carrier).

1921, p. 85. "
Co., 248 U. S. 149 (ii8); The
(holding invalid a "loan clause"
that loans so made should enure
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general, and such a valuation has been repeatedly held to be legal' 1
despite the fact that it enables the shipowner to evade the spirit
of the Harter Act while strictly keeping to the letter.
Perhaps no single clause in the whole bill of lading as it then
stood has caused more bad feeling and hardship than that which
prescribes the conditions on which the shipper must make claims
for loss or damage. Generally it reads somewhat as follows:
"Claims for loss or damage to be made at port of discharge and
at no other port. No claim will be admitted unless agents are
notified in writing before the goods are taken receipt of. Claims
will not be paid unless rendered within thirty days of the steamer's
arrival." An even more iniquitous form reads, "All claims for
short delivery, loss or damage must be made in writing to the
steamer's agent at the port of destination of the goods within 48
hours after the steamer or lighter has finished discharging and
always before the goods are taken away from alongside the ship
or lighter. In case such claims shall not be presented in writing
within the time and place here designated, such claim shall be
deemed to be waived and the steamer to be discharged therefrom."
The injustice of these clauses needs no argument. The efficiency
with which theft and pilferage are carried on today necessitates a
complete examination of the goods before it can be ascertained if
they are in good order and condition and it is absurd to suggest
that the package must be opened on the pier or dock, and the
contents there examined. Admittedly the mobility of conditions
in the shipping business renders prompt notice of claim essential
to the shipowner, but there is no justification of the absurdly low
time limit specified.
The manifest defects and diversity of bills of lading gave
rise to a demand for a better and more uniform contract in the
United States, and as a result of hearings before the Interstate
Commerce Commission, a uniform through export bill of. lading
was finally prescribed in October, 1921, by order of the Commission. 12 The agitation for improvement was, however, interna'Hart v. Penna. R. R. Co.,

U. S. 544 (1915).
' 64 I. C. C 347

(1921),

112

U. S. 331 (1884); Reid v. Fargo, 241

and amended 66 I. C. C. 687 (1922).
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tional in its scope and Wvas perhaps even more marked in the
United Kingdom than in the United States. The Dominions
Royal Commission in its report presented to both Houses of
Parliament in March, 1917, unanimously recommended legislation
on the lines of the Canadian Water Carriage of Goods Act, i9io.
On the 26th of July, 1918, the Imperial War Conference passed
resolutions which recommended the appointment of an Imperial
Investigation Board to inquire into and report, inter alia, on all
matters connected with Ocean freights and facilities. On June
15, 1920, the Prime Minister, Mr. D. Lloyd George, appointed a
Committee under the title of the Imperial Shipping Committee,
with power to inquire into complaints from persons and bodies
interested with regard to Ocean freights, facilities and conditions.
The Committee in its Report 13 unanimously recommended legislation on the lines of the Canadian Water Carriage of Goods Act,
i9io, with certain specified reservations.

The Maritime Law Committee of the International Law
Association, realising that legislation in the United Kingdom and
the British Dominions would not have a universal character, set
to work to prepare an International Code, following the precedent
in connection with the rules covering General Average, known as
the York-Antwerp Rules, 1890,14 for which the same Committee
was responsible. A draft code was submitted, in July, i92i,
to a meeting of the International Chamber of Commerce. Meetings between interested parties, shippers, consignees, bankers,
underwriters and shipowneis were held in London and elsewhere
to consider the situation, and eventually at a Conference at The
Hague in September, I9j2I, 15 The Hague Rules, i92i, were agreed
and resolutions were added recommending their coming into effect
on all shipments after January 31, 1922.

In the following

November an International Shipping Conference was held in
'Report of the Imperial Shipping Committee on the Limitation of Shipowner's Liability by Clauses in B's/L, and on certain other matters relating
to B's/L, February 25, I921.
'York-Antwerp Rules (General Average); I. Rev. de Dr. Mar. Comp. x,
638; II id. 719; VII id. 31, 6oi; VIII id. 1, 616.
Hague Rules. XXXIII Rev. Int. de Dr. Mar. .78, 261, 495, 502, 684,
701, 976; I Rev. de Dr. Mar. Comp. 652; II id. 25, 36, 720, 722; III id. 617,
618, 627, 632; IV id. 13, 49, 55; VII id. 29; VIII id. 366.
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London, at which were represented the owners of more than 90
per cent. of the shipping tonnage of the world. While the conference was not in agreement with all the provisions of the Rules,
notably the £ioo valuation, 16 it agreed to accept them if there was
a real desire on the part of shippers that they should be accepted,
provided that they were made uniform in all maritime countries
so that all shipowners would be under the same disability.
Subsequently some British interests opposed the Rules, espedally with regard to bulk cargoes, 17 but the Board of Trade held
a conference of owners and shippers, and an agreement was
reached-largely on account of the threat of the government to
pass legislation on this subject, which the shipowners feared would
be worse than The Hague Rules. An international conference was
then called to London in October, 1922, by the Comit6 Maritime
Internationale, and after much discussion and the incorporation
of several amendments the Rules were unanimously accepted and
the text was pfesented to a conference at Brussels of the diplomatic representatives of twenty-four commercial nations, including Great Britain and the United States, which finally adopted
them. It remained for the several States to enact legislation
which should incorporate the Rules. Great Britain has done this
in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,"' which is already in full
effect; France has passed an act which will not take effect until
other nations shall have done likewise, and a Bill 19 has been before
Congress for two years, which after an interminable series of
Hearings seems to have a good prospect of becoming law in the
near future. The Rules are stated in French in the official version, and for a while it seemed that important discrepancies would
exist in the English and American Acts, but this possibility has
been eliminated by an agreement as to the official translation into
English.
Article I of The Hague Rules concerns itself entirely with
definitions of the various terms used throughout the Rules. The
"Art. IV, sec. 5.

'Art. III, Rules 4 and 5; and also sec. 6, Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,
14 G-eo. 5, 1 Q.22 (1924).
14 Geo. 5, c. 22 (194).

H. R. 14166, A Bill Relating to the Carriage of Goods by Sea.
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definition which is probably of most importance, and certainly
that which has been most frequently amended, is the one which
refers to the contract of carriage. "The term 'contract of carriage' applies to contracts of carriage covered by a bill of lading
or any similar document of title, in so far as such document relates
to the carriage of goods by sea, including any bill of lading or
any similar document as aforesaid issued under or pursuant to a
charter-party from the moment at which such bill of lading or
similar document of title regulates the relations between a carrier
and an holder of the same." 20 A bill of lading is a document
evidencing the contract of shipment,21 but seems not to have been
defined in any English or American statute. Where there is no
charter-party and the bill of lading is issued by the shipowners
or their agent the case presents no difficulties, but the existence of
a charter-party complicates the question. In such a case the bill
of lading could only serve the purpose of a receipt as between the
owner and charterer, the complete terms of the contract being
contained in the charter-party,2 2 but as regards third parties, the
definition states that the term shall include a bill of lading issued
under a charter-party, from the moment at which the bill of
lading "regulates the relations between the carrier and the holder
of the same" (that is in practice from the time at which the bill
is negotiated) while Article V of the Rules requires that "if bills
of lading are issued in the case of a ship under a charter-party
they shall comply with the terms of these Rules." The Rules
therefore seem to apply to all bills of lading: if the charterer
wants a mere receipt for goods put on board he must take it in
some other form than a bill of lading. It must however be clearly
borne in mind that for this purpose the chief quality in a bill of
lading, as envisaged by the Rules, is negotiability-for it is
expressly provided in Article VI that such other form must be
non-negotiable. This raises a matter, more pertinent to the
:'Art. I (b).
HuGHES-ADMIRALTY, I6I; The Montana, 129 U. S. 401 (1883) ; Mason
v. Lickbarrow, i H. BI. 357 (Eng. i79o) ; Sewell v. Burdick, iO A. C. 74 (Eng.
1884).
'Leduc v. Ward, 2o Q. B. D. 479 (Eng. 1888), per Lord Esher; Turner
v. Haji (i9o4) A. C. 826.
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American than to the English lawyer, of the difference between a
private carrier and a common carrier by sea, and the question may
arise as to the right of a shipper to demand a bill of lading when
he has loaded goods on a vessel chartered by himself for that
purpose. Clearly as between the charterer and the shipowner the
terms of the charter-party will govern, and The Hague Rules will
not apply. They will also not apply if the charterer takes a nonnegotiable receipt for the goods shipped-but if the shipowner
issues a bill of lading in negotiable form the Rules will apply to
such bill from the time at which it is negotiated. The right of a
charterer to demand a negotiable bill of lading from the shipowner
is therefore of great importance.
The definitions of "Carrier," "Ship" and "Goods" are substantially in line with previous statutory and juristic statement.
and need no comment, but it will be noted that the definition of
"Carriage of Goods" 28 does not in any way alter the twilight zone
which was seen to exist at each end of the voyage. The Rules, in
fact, relate only to the period which was covered by bills of lading
before those documents had developed into contracts providing
for a variety of additional services which may include collection
and delivery before and after the voyage, and sometimes also
transport overland and warehousing while in transit. Before the
Rules apply, and after they have ceased to govern the contract the
existing legislation and maritime custom24 of the country will
govern the rights and duties of the parties.
Article II 25 provides that all contracts of carriage by sea
shall be subject to the Rules. The Rules so far as they go are a
complete and self-contained set of rules: they constitute the complete basis of the contract between the parties. As pointed out by
Sir Norman Hill in evidence before the Joint Committee of Par"Art. I (e) "Carriage of goods" covers the period from the time when
the goods are loaded on to the time when they are discharged from the ship;
see also Gilchrist Trading Co. v. Boston, 223 Fed. 716 (C. C. A. I915) as to
the position of the law under the Harter Act.
"Coggs v. Bernard, Smith's Leading Cases, i2th ed., Vol. I, pp. 226, 257.
"Subject to the provisions of Article VI, under every contract of carriage of goods by sea the carrier, in relation to the loading, handling, stowage,
carriage, custody, care and discharge of such goods, shall be subject to the responsibilities and liabilities and entitled to the rights and immunities, hereinafter set forth."
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liament in 1923, "The responsibilities and liabilities imposed on
the shipowner by the Rules are to take the place of all existing
warranties and implied undertakings under either English or other
laws."
Article III 2 sets out the responsibilities and liabilities of the
shipowner. This is one of the fundamental innovations of the
Rules; heretofore we have been very largely content with negative
statements of what the shipowner might not do, but now we are
confronted with a complete and positive statement of the extent
"Responsibilities and Liabilities.
I. The carrier shall be bound, before and at the beginning of the voyage,
to exercise due diligence to(a) Make the ship seaworthy;
(b) Properly man, equip, and supply the ship;
(c) Make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other
parts of the ship in which goods are carried, fit and safe for their
reception, carriage and preservation.
2. Subject to the provisions of Article IV, the carrier shall properly
and carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for and discharge
the goods carried.
3. After receiving the goods into his charge, the carrier, or the master
or agent of the carrier, shall, on demand of the shipper, issue to the
shipper a bill of lading showing among other things(a) The leading marks necessary for identification of the goods as
the same are furnished in writing by the shipper before the loading of such goods starts, provided such marks are stamped or
otherwise shown clearly upon the goods if uncovered, or on the
cases or coverings in which such goods are contained, in such a
manner as should ordinarily remain legible until the end of the
voyage;
(b) Either the number of packages or pieces, or the quantity, or
weight, as the case may be, as furnished in writing by the shipper;
(c) The apparent order and condition of the goods;
Provided that no carrier, master or agent of the carrier, shall be
bound to state or show in the bill of lading any marks, number, quantity, or weight which he has reasonable ground for suspecting not accurately to represent the goods actually received, or which he has had
no reasonable -means of checking.
4. Such a bill of lading shall be prima fade evidence of the receipt by the
carrier of the goods as therein described in accordance with paragraph 3 (a), (b) and (c).
5. The shipper shall be deemed to have guaranteed to the carrier the
accuracy at the time of shipment of the marks, number, quantity, and
weight, as furnished by him, and the shipper shall indemnify the carrier against all loss, damages, and expenses arising or resulting from
inaccuracies in such particulars. The right of the carrier to such indemnity shall in no way limit his responsibility and liability under
'the contract of carriage to any person other than the shipper.
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of the liabilities and responsibilities which he is to bear. First
of all the carrier shall use due diligence to make the ship both
equip her. 27
seaworthy and cargoworthy, and to properly man and
Read in conjunction with Article IV, it will be seen that this does
not reduce the shipowner's liability below that to which he could
by appropriate stipulation reduce his liability under the Harter
Act, 28 but whereas the Harter Act was merely a permissive statute

there is found in the Rules a positive statement of the reduced
liability. It marks an even greater change in English law where
an absolute warranty of seaworthiness had previously been implied when there was no specific exemption contained in the con6. Unless notice of loss or damage and the general nature of such loss
or damage be given in writing to the carrier or his agent at the port
of discharge before or at the time of the removal of the goods into
the custody of the person entitled to delivery thereof under the contract of carriage, or, if the loss or damage be not apparent, within
three days, such removal shall be prima facie evidence of the delivery
by the carrier of the goods as described in the bill of lading.
The notice in writing need not be given if the state of the goods
has at the time of their receipt been the subject of joint survey or inspection.
In any event the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all
liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within
one year after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods
should have been delivered.
In the case of any actual or apprehended loss or damage the carrier and the receiver shall give all reasonable facilities to each other
for inspecting and tallying the goods.
7. After the goods are loaded the bill of lading to be issued by the carrier, master or agent of the carrier, to the shipper shall, if the shipper
so demands, be a "shipped" bill of lading, provided that if the shipper
shall have previously taken up any document of title to such goods, he
shall surrender the same as against the issue of the "shipped" bill of
lading, but at the option of the carrier such document of title may be
noted, at the port of shipment by the carrier, master, or agent with
the name or names of the ship or ships upon which the goods have
been shipped and the date or dates of shipment, and when so noted the
same shall for the purpose of this Article be deemed to constitute
a "shipped" bill of lading.
8. Any clause, covenant or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving
the carrier or the ship from liability for loss or jdamage to or in
connection with goods arising from negligence, fault or failure in the
duties and obligations provided in this Article or lessening such liability otherwise than as provided in these Rules, shall be null and void
and of no effect.
A benefit of insurance or similar clause shall be deemed to be a
clause relieving the carrier from liability.
'Article III, section i.
'27 Stat 445 (U. S. Comp. St. sec. 8o3I), The Irrawaddy, 171 U. S.
187 (1897); The Prussia, 93 Fed. 837 (C. C. A. 1899); The Carib Prince,
i7o U. S. 655 (1897).
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tract.2 9 Secondly, and again subject to the provisions of Article
IV, the shipowner must properly and carefully "load, handle, stow,
carry, keep, care for and discharge the goods carried." 30 This
provision agrees generally with the legislation of the United States
and of the British Dominions, but is new to English law. The
obligation will be limited to the duration of the "carriage of
goods," as set out in Article I (e), and the construction of the
terms would seem to be that existing in the Admiralty judgments
of the several states so that there will be little change in existing
law apart- from the statement of a positive liability of the shipowner. Having received the goods the carrier must issue to the
shipper a hill ef lading 3 1 giving the leading marks and general
details of the goods, such particulars being guaranteed by the
shipper. 2 It is however provided in section 3, that the carrier
is not bound to issue abill of lading showing particulars which he
has reason to doubt or which he has no reasonable means of
checking, a provision substantially similar to that of the United
States Bills of Lading Act. 32 a It should be noted also that the
British Act provides 8 3 that "where under the custom of any trade
the weight of any bulk cargo inserted in a Bill of Lading is a
weight ascertained or accepted by a third party other than the
carrier or the shipper and the fact that the weight is so ascertained
or accepted is stated in the bill of lading, then, notwithstanding
anything in the Rules, the bill of lading shall not be deemed to be
prima facie evidence against the carrier of the receipt of the goods
of the weight so inserted in the bill of lading, and the accuracy
thereof at the time of shipment shall not be deemed to have been
guaranteed by the shipper." This provision will give considerable
relief from the Rules to those engaged in the shipment of bulk
cargoes of produce which is graded and weighed by a marketing
organization (e. g. wheat), but in every other case the bill of
" Steel v. State Line, 3 A. C. 86 (Eng. 1877), per Lord Blackburn.
'Article III, section 2.
"Article III, section 3.
"Article III, sectiod S.
'39 Stats. 538.
"Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 14 Geo. 5, c. 22, sec. 5 (I9z4).
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lading is to be prima facie evidence of the receipt by the carrier
of the goods as described therein-a practice in conformity with
existing law in both Great Britain and the United States, as in
34
almost all maritime countries.
The question of notice of loss or damage is dealt with in
section 6 of Article III, by the terms of which acceptance of the
goods by the consignee is to be prima facie evidence of their good
order and condition, although if the loss or damage is not apparent
the consignee is given three days after removal of the goods in
which to give notice in writing of such loss or damage. 35 In any
case even if notice is not given "' the consignee may take legal
proceedings against the carrier or the ship within one year after the
delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been
delivered. The provisions of this section are infinitely more liberal
towards the shipper than those contained in the majority of the
bills of lading customarily in use before the drafting of the
Rules 3 6 -and it is with these clauses that comparison should be
made rather than with the Statute of Limitations in the various
States which will be superseded by the Rules in this particlar
respect. It should however be borne in mind that this section is
governed by the definition of "carriage of goods" found in the
first article of the Rules, and consequently the "time of removal of
the goods into the custody of the person entitled to delivery
thereof under the contract of carriage" in this Rule is the time
when the goods are discharged from the ship.
"Received for shipment" bills of lading have become necessary to modern commerce by reason of the growing complexity of
marketing and transportation organisations. The legal value of
" Smith v. Bedouin, (1896) A. C. 70; Elder Dempster v. Dunn, ioi L. T.
R. 578 (Eng. igog); Brittan v. Barnaby, 21 How. 527 (U. S. 1858); U. S.

Fed. B/L Act-secs. 20, 21, 22.
"In the original draft of the American bill this section differed very considerably from the English translation, but the discrepancy has been remedied

in the draft now before Congress.
' Sec. 13 Report of Joint Committee (923) on p. ix-a provision which
seems to make some change in American law.
"LFGGETT-BLLs oF LADING, p. xlviii, xliii; CAV-ER-CARRIA
OF GooDs
BY SEA, p. 161; Australian U. S. N. Co. v. Hunt, 2 A. C. 351 (Eng. 1876).
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37
such a document under English law is however doubtful, and
appears not to have been decisively passed upon by the American
In order to avoid any doubt as to the validity of this
courts.3a
document the Rules provide 38 that after the goods have been
loaded on board the vessel a "received for shipment" bill of lading
may be surrendered in return for a shipped bill of lading issued
by the carrier or his agent. Alternatively the carrier may note
upon the existing document the name of the vessel and the particulars of the voyage, in which case it shall be deemed to be a
shipped bill of lading. It will be seen that no complete solution
of the thorny problem has been attempted, particularly as regards
c. i. f. contracts,-but it is apparent that received for shipment
bills of lading will tend to be exchanged for the more widely recognised document as soon as the goods are actually shipped.

Finally, to round off Article

III,39 it is provided that any

clause in a bill of lading which 5ets out to limit in any way the
obligations placed upon the shipowner by these rules shall be null
and void, and it is specifically provided that "a benefit of insurance
or similar clause shall be deemed to be a clause relieving the carrier
from liability."
Under the third Article of the Rules the carrier has assumed
a considerable number of positive responsibilities, and in Article
IV is found the counterpoise for the contract-the rights and
immunities conferred upon the shipowner. First of all the shipowner is not to be held liable for latent defects in the hull or
equipment of the vessel, unless a loss resulting from such defect
can be directly attributed to a failure to exercise due diligence to
make the ship seaworthy and cargoworthy as provided ih the first
'In the Marlborough Hill (i92i) Privy i A. C. 444 Lord Phillimore indicated that a "received for shipment" bill of lading is a bill of lading
for all purposes, but in Diamond Alkali Export Co. v. Bourgiois, (1921) 3
K. B. 443, Mr. Justice McCardie held that "a received for shipment bill of
ladin is not a fulfilment of the seller's obligation under a c. i. f. contract."
la In the "Caroline Miller," 53 Fed. 136 (C. C. 1892) a received for shipment bill of lading was held to be "no bill of lading at all," but in the "Guiding Star," 53 Fed. 936 (C. C. 1893), such a document was held to be covered
by a State statute regulating bills of lading. Both of these however are old
decisions and the question appears not to have come before the Courts in recent years.
' Art. III, sec. 7.
"Art. III, sec. 8.
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section of Article 111.40 In this respect The Hague Rules differ
greatly from the Harter Act, under the terms of which a shipowner was unable to claim the benefit of the stipulated exemptions
if any lack of due diligence, whether responsible for the casualty
or not, could be shown by the claimant.
Moreover a large number of individual casualties are set
out 41 for which he is not to be held liable. These are in substance
the perils which were customarily excepted in bills of lading, but
additional clauses limiting the liability of the shipowner will now
be null and void, 42 so that uniformity has at last been secured in
a matter where it was most urgently needed. "Any reasonable
deviation," it is provided in section 4, "shall not be deemed to be
an infringement or breach of these Rules . . . and the carrier
shall not be liable for any loss or damage resulting therefrom."
Deviation in an attempt to save life or property at sea are specifically mentioned, and "any reasonable deviation" (interpreted in
the light of the clause which it replaced) would seem to mean "any
deviation authorised by the contract of carriage provided that
such deviation shall be reasonable having regard to the service in
which the ship is engaged." At the Diplomatic Conference in
Brussels in October, 1922, the enlarged sentence was transformed
into the three words "any reasonable deviation." 43
In the fifth section a value of one hundred pounds sterling
per package " is agreed upon as the figure up to which the carrier
shall be liable, and while the parties are at liberty to agree upon
another valuation if they choose, that valuation shall not be less
than £1oo. Thus the loophole through which the terms of the
Harter Act were evaded 45 has been carefully closed. The remaining section of the Article dealing with dangerous goods is in
all respects similar to existing law in both America and Great
Britain.4"
'Art. IV, see. i.
"Art IV, sec. .
"Art. III, sec. 8.
"Report of the British Delegates, pp. 22, 72-3.
" In the American bill this is converted into dollars.
"Calderon v. Atlas SS. Co., ixo U. S. 272 (1897); Morris v. Oceanic,
x6 L. T. R. 533 (Eng. x899).
"Act of Congress March 4,igog; Merchant Shipping Act 1894, sec. 446.
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Under Article V the carrier may surrender his rights and
immunities iri whole or in part, provided that such an agreement
is specifically embodied in the bill of lading. On the other hand,
under Article VI any special agreement may be entered into betwveen" parties in the case of particular goods (not of ordinary
commercial shipments) relieving the carrier of his liability in
whole or in part. This provision however will allow a diminution
in the carrier's liability as to seaworthiness only in so far as such
a stipulation is not contrary to public policy, and in any case the
Article is only to appl to "shipments where the character or condition of the property to be carried, or the circumstances, terms
and conditions under which the carriage is to be performed, are
such as reasonably to justify a special agreement." 47 The special
provisions as to coastwise traffic contained in the British Act 48
are subject to this rule-and in any such case the Rules provide
that the contract of carriage shall be in a non-negotiable form.
The remaining Articles serve to round off the Rules and to
prevent any misunderstanding of the extent to which they might
supersede existing national law. Article VII provides that the
carrier may enter into any agreement he pleases as to the handling
of the goods prior to loading on board his vessel and subsequently
to their discharge. This Article is omitted from the bill now
before Congress, a fact which is probably due to the provision in
American law that the negligence of public servants is contrary to
public policy. 48 a This rule would therefore limit any such contracts that might be made by an American shipowner. Article
VIII provides that the Rules shall not in any way "affect the rights
and obligations of the carrier under any statute for the iime being
in force relating to the limitation of the liability of the owners of
seagoing vessels." Thus the rights of shipowners under Sections
502, 503 of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 and under Sections 4282-4289 Rev. Stat., the Act of June 26, 1884, and Act of
June 19, 1886 49 will remain the same as heretofore.8 0
"Art. VI, (c).
"Section 4.

Railway Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357 (U. S. 1872); The Montana,

129 U. S. 397, at p. 438 (x888).

U. S. Comp. Stat. sections 8o20-8027, 8028, 8o29.
'Art. IX, the remaining Article, merely states that the monetary units
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To claim that The Hague Rules will serve as an universal
panacea for the ills of shipping, or that they will create that uniformity in Admiralty Law which is so ardently desired would be
to crush them out of existence by too heavy a load. They are
however a distinct improvement upon conditions as they existed
previously. To mention only a few of the manifest advantages
that they have achieved, the uniformity of bills of lading might
be stated first. In addition, the liability of the carrier has been
definitely stated; the minimum valuation per package of cargo
has been greatly increased; a more reasonable provision has been
made for notice of claims; the burden of proof has been placed
upon the carrier in those cases in which he would seek to take
advantage of a stated immunity and the much-disliked benefit of
insurance clause has been eliminated. Stated in their baldest
terms these factors make a rather stupendous array from the point
of view of the commercial world, and their value to the Admiralty
lawyer is no less startling. Twenty years were consumed in the
effort to draft the York-Antwerp Rules, 189o, and these were only
a code of rules regarding general average which might be adopted
at the option of the parties in any given case. Yet the drafting
and preparation of The Hague Rules in the form which received
unanimous acceptance at the hands of the Diplomatic Representatives present at the Brussels Conference had taken less than two
years!
These things, however, must not blind us to the fact that the
Rules are by no means perfect. To point to their weaknesses is
not to deny their value but rather to point out the directions in
which they can be improved in the near future. First of all no
effort has been made to eliminate the "twilight zone" at each end
of the voyage. Admittedly this would not have been easy, for,
to make the rules applicable to goods before they reached the ship
and after they had been discharged from the ship would necessitate their extension beyond the realm of the sea into the territorial
jurisdiction of the several States. Such a course would have
mentioned in the Rules shall be taken to be gold value-a provision which has
been avoided by the statement of the minimum. liability in the national currency of each country enacting the Rules.
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greatly weakened the chances of an international acceptance of
the Rules. The problem, however, is not a new one, because as
we have already pointed out the Harter Act failed also in this
respect-and as-in the previous case the local law of the state in
which the port is situate will apply to the goods during the period
before The Hague Rules begin to apply and after they have ceased
to apply.
Secondly there is the uncertainty as to the application of the
Rules in the case of contracts for the whole reach of the vessel.
It is perfectly clear, as has already been stated, that all negotiable
bills of lading will be governed by the Rules; it is equally clear
that as between the charterer and the owner of the chartered vessel
the relations will be determined by the terms of the charter party.
Provided such a charterer accepts a non-negotiable receipt for
goods shipped on board the vessel, the Rules will not apply, but
if he receives a bill of lading and negotiates it the Rules will apply
from the time of such endorsement. 51 The third section of
Article III provides that the carrier "shall, on demand of the
shipper, issue to the shipper a bill of lading," and it would seem
that this section applies equally in the case of both common and
private carriers. If this is so, the Rules will go far to abolish the
distinction in American law between these two groups, a distinction which has already ceased to have any practical significance in
the English courts.
The drafting of the Rules in the above case is not as careful
as one could have wished-and the same charge may be brought
against Article IV, section 2, subsection (q), which provides that
"the burden of proof shall be on the person claiming the benefit of
this exception to show that neither the actual fault or privity of
the carrier, etc.,

.

.

.

contributed to the loss or damage."

Again in the first section of the same Article it is provided that
"whenever loss or damage has resulted from unseaworthiness the
burden of proving the exercise of due diligence shall be upon the
carrier." The specific mention of the burden of proof in these
two cases might seem to indicate that in the case of the several
other specified exemptions the burden of proof is not to rest upon
n.Art. I (b).
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the carrier. The most casual reference to the several reports of
the discussion at the conferences from which the Rules were
evolved demonstrates the falsity of this assumption, and shows
that in every case the burden of proof is to rest upon the carrier
who is claiming the advantage of a particular exemption. The
vagueness of the Rules however in both this case and the one
previously mentioned should be remedied without delay, because
vagueness of any sort is not to be tolerated in a document which
is designed to secure the international uniformity of maritime law.
If the uniformity of Admiralty Law throughout the great
maritime states of the world is an ideal which proves attractive to
the jurist, how much more atractive will it prove to the economist
who finds himself confronted with a world which is daily being
more closely knit by the bonds of ocean transportation? Shipping
has extended its tentacles to every corner of the world and in
many cases the carrier is bound to find himself at the mercy of a
jurisdiction with whose concept of maritime law he is totally
unfamiliar. Perhaps this cannot be avoided: perhaps the rapid
growth of nationalism is to be the characteristic feature of the
present generation-but in the universal approval of The Hague
Rules there lies a factor which leaves hope that it may be the first
step upon the road to a goal that is desired alike by lawyers and
economists-the uniformity of maritime law.
F. Cyril James.
University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia.

